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.And I wouldalways say, `That's nice to be inclusive and to bring people along.However, there aretimes where you have personal relationships and& they don't want other people.Theywant to be able to confide, quietly tell you what they think.' [2] Najera was sensitive tohis role in the inside game:  I've been accused of giving away the store by people thatdon't understand this game.I consider that a false accusation which is veryunfounded. [2]Steve Scott of the California Journal observed that the behavior of the voluntaryhealth agencies' lobbyists was typical of the tendency of the lobbyists in Sacramentoto live in their own world:As somebody who covers the Capitol, I can't be too critical of the way they [thevoluntary health agency lobbyists] approach the Legislature.& You tend to become aproduct of the system in which you operate and over time I'm sure that these lobbyistsare no different from any other lobbyists.Over time you become inculcated into theculture and you start to think in incremental terms rather than in bolder terms.Butthat's why you have grassroots.& Ultimately the lobbyists are employees.And if thepeople who employ them don't look beyond what they are telling them, then they arenot doing their members any good service either.So I don't think that the grassrootsarms of the organizations can be exempted from a share of responsibility for allowingthe Prop.99 situation to atrophy the way it did.Because the repository for all wisdomisn't the lobbyist in Sacramento.[4] 287 Thanks to Proposition 99, the TCS and ANR leadership, and the LLA directors, thelocal tobacco control coalitions were getting stronger and more organized.They couldnot understand why the lobbyists in Sacramento were not reaching out to tap thispower.At the same time, things were changing at the AHA in a way that would lead to amuch stronger appreciation of the grassroots.Mary Adams had recently replaced DianKiser as AHA's lobbyist.While Adams had been involved in the early Proposition 99fights as the ACS lobbyist (as Mary Dunn), she had lived in Europe for several yearsand had only returned to Sacramento in November 1994.She was surprised at how farthe Proposition 99 allocations had deviated from the terms of the initiative.In craftinga legislative strategy for 1996, Adams felt that the voluntary health agencies needed toopen up the process and involve new people, particularly those in the field who hadbeen fostered by Proposition 99's community-based activity.[5] She also recognizedthe need for the tobacco control advocates to be more nonpartisan and bipartisan:I wanted to have both Democratic and Republican representatives.Because in thepast, we'd just always focused on the Democrats and I felt like that wasn't going to getus where we needed to go.& I started communicating to my organization aftermeeting with this group and I hawked the same three points all the way through withthis group that I had drawn together and then with my own organization: that weneeded to have an intensive grassroots effort,& that we had to have intensive use ofthe media to get the public to focus on the issue, and that we needed to have a contractlobbyist with Republican ties who would be able to work the issue for us in asuccessful way.And then I shored that up with just my strong feeling that this was allgoing to take place through the budget, that it was not going to go through the normallegislative track.[5]Having been absent from the battles in Sacramento over the past few years, Adamshad an easier time recognizing strategic errors that the voluntary health agencies hadmade:  The strategies that had been used in the past& had been dismal failures.WhenI left, there was a ton of money coming.When I came back I saw the whole thing in areal mess.I knew that we had to draw together many more facets, many moreapproaches than had been used in the past. [5] Adams wanted a more aggressivecampaign to defend Proposition 99 that reached well beyond the Capitol building andwas determined to get ANR and its past president, Stanton Glantz, on board.But involving Glantz and ANR was not just a matter of adding their names to acoalition letterhead and proceeding with business as usual. 288 Neither Glantz nor the ANR leadership had much confidence in pursuing the kind ofinsider game that had failed for the last several years.They were committed to actionwith a strong grassroots component based on their experience doing battle overPropositions 5, 10, and P and passing hundreds of local ordinances.They alsorecognized the central role that the CMA and other medical interests had played inlegitimizing the diversion of money out of the Health Education and ResearchAccounts; they viewed neutralizing the CMA as the crucial first step to restoringProposition 99.But they doubted that the voluntary health agencies would have thenerve to confront the CMA, much less the governor or the Legislature.ANR had built its reputation as a grassroots organization by being a confrontationaloutsider.Even if it could be persuaded to change its focus from local ordinance fights,its preferred strategy, to a state-level one, it would certainly not compromise its stylein the process.ANR had its own vision of what was needed in the Proposition 99fight.According to ANR co-director Robin Hobart,One thing that we realized was that the only way you were going to see realreauthorization of Prop.99 at the full level and this was based on our experiencewith [Proposition] 188 in some ways was that you're going to have to run it like anelection campaign, not like just any old bill.It had to really be a campaign with all theattendant grassroots strategy and media strategy and inside-the-Capitol strategy.& The other thing that we knew based on how the governor had responded and theLegislature responded to our lawsuits we were successful in court but havingabsolutely no effect whatsoever with regards to what the Legislature was prepared todo was that it was going to have to be a real gloves-off campaign.People weregoing to have to name names.And the California Medical Association was going tohave to be forced to get out of the way.[6]ANR could envision an effective strategy, but it had no intention of actually gettinginvolved [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]