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.In a 1954 briefing to representatives of the various branches of the armedservices, Gen.Curtis LeMay, then head of Strategic Air Command (SAC), wasasked the question,   How do SAC s plans fit in with the stated national policythat the United States will never strike the first blow?  His response was:I have heard this thought stated many times and it sounds very fine.However, it is not in keeping with the United States history.Just lookback and note who started the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812,the Indian Wars, and the Spanish-American War.I want to make clearthat I am not advocating a preventive war; however, I believe that if theU.S.is pushed in the corner far enough we would not hesitate to strikefirst.55In the end, the question was, how far would the United States have to bepushed before a preventive war would be acceptable? Would the UnitedStates have to be under attack, or in imminent danger of attack? Or could acombination of (perceived) harmful intentions plus mounting capabilities beenough to push the United States to strike first?The Joint Chiefs of StaffIn 1945, less than two weeks after the bombing of Hiroshima, Gen.GeorgeC.Marshall ordered a study of the military implications of atomic weapons.The Joint Strategic Survey Committee ( JSSC) presented its conclusions onHow Real Was   Dr.Strangelove?  75October 30, 1945:Concerning the possible changes in techniques of warfare, the JSSC sawthe atomic bomb primarily as a strategic weapon.However, itsadvent accentuated the value of surprise, and so emphasized the need  not only of readiness for immediate defense, but also for striking first,if necessary.  Later in its analysis the JSSC repeated this thought,holding that an effective action against the source of an atomic attackon the United States might require   us to strike first.  56General Eisenhower, however, did not approve of the analysis, as it didnot discuss the   present US strategic superiority stemming from atomicmonopoly nor its transitory nature,  or in other words, America s closingwindow of strategic advantage.He thus ordered the JSSC to revise its draft inlight of his comments.The newest draft concluded:The United States must have either a hard-boiled and enforceable worldagreement against the use of atomic weapons or, with its allies, exclusivesupremacy in the field.The United States was now in the best positionto obtain and enforce a world agreement five years hence would betoo late.certain features of the atomic bomb should be kept in mind.Defense against it would always be inadequate, but top priority should begiven to effective means of stopping the carrying vehicles.57In effect, this is an early argument for pre-emption, and possibly preven-tion.The implication of this study is that should a   hard-boiled and en-forceable agreement  not come to pass, then the United States must preventits enemies from acquiring nuclear capability utilizing a preventive strike.And should its adversaries come into possession of atomic weapons,   toppriority should be given to effective means of stopping the carrying vehicles, which is to say a pre-emptive strike on their bombers (in a similar scenario toIsrael s pre-emptive attack in 1967 against Egyptian planes).This strategymight be considered to be defensive, and not pre-emptive.However, the firstpart of the passage suggests that the United States should, along with itsallies, maintain   exclusive supremacy  in atomic weapons.If the Soviet Unionwould not agree to international control of atomic weapons, then it is un-likely that anything short of a preventive strike against their nuclear facilitieswould achieve U.S.supremacy.Similarly, in 1946, Gen.Leslie Groves, director of the Manhattan Project,wrote:If we were truly realistic.we would not permit any foreign power withwhich we are not firmly allied, and in which we do not have absolute76 Why Leaders Choose Warconfidence to make or possess atomic weapons.If such a country startedto make atomic weapons we would destroy its capacity to make thembefore it had progressed far enough to threaten us [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]