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.TheBush Administration initially tasked Lt.Gen.Jay Garner (ret.) to directreconstruction, with a staff of U.S.government personnel to serve as advisers andadministrators in Iraq s ministries.He headed the Office of Reconstruction andHumanitarian Assistance (ORHA), within the Department of Defense, created by aJanuary 20, 2003 executive order.Garner and his staff deployed in April 2003.Garner tried to quickly establish a representative successor Iraqi regime.He,and White House envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, organized a meeting in Nasiriyah (April15, 2003) of about 100 Iraqis of varying ethnicities and ideologies.Another meetingof about 250 delegates was held in Baghdad on April 26, 2003, ending in agreementto hold a broader meeting, within a month, to name an interim Iraqi administration.In parallel, major exile parties began a series of meetings, with U.S.envoys present.25For analysis of the former regime s WMD and other abuses, see CRS Report RL32379,Iraq: Former Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights Violations, and U.S.Policy.26Some of the information in this section was obtained during author s participation in acongressional delegation to Iraq during Feb.26-Mar.2, 2004.The visit to Baghdad, Basra,and Tallil included meetings with CPA head L.Paul Bremer, the commander of U.S.forcesin Iraq Lt.Gen.Ricardo Sanchez, and various local and national Iraqi political figures andother CPA, U.S., and coalition military officials.CRS-17Press reports said that senior U.S.officials were dissatisfied with Garner s laxapproach to governing, including tolerance for Iraqis naming themselves as localleaders.In May 2003, the Administration named former ambassador L.Paul Bremerto replace Garner by heading a  Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), whichsubsumed ORHA.The CPA was an occupying authority recognized by U.N.Security Council Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003).Bremer suspended Garner spolitical transition process and instead agreed to appoint a 25- to 30-member Iraqibody, which would have more than purely advisory powers but not formalsovereignty.Bremer said this  Governing Council would nominate ministry heads,recommend policies, and draft an interim constitution.27Another alteration of the U.S.post-war structure was made public in earlyOctober 2003; an  Iraq Stabilization Group under the direction of former NationalSecurity Adviser (now Secretary of State) Condoleezza Rice was formed tocoordinate interagency support to the CPA.A Rice deputy, Robert Blackwill, hadbeen the NSC s primary official for the Iraq transition, but he resigned from theAdministration in November 2004.In March 2005, Secretary Rice namedAmbassador Richard Jones, former ambassador to Kuwait, as her chief advisor andcoordinator for Iraq.The Administration s post-war policy did not make extensiveuse of a State Department initiative, called the  Future of Iraq Project, that drew upplans for administration by Iraqis after the fall of Saddam, although some Iraqis whoparticipated in that project are now in official positions in Iraq s government.TheState Department project, which cost $5 million, consisted of about 15 workinggroups on major issues.28The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC).On July 13, 2003, Bremer named the Iraq Governing Council (IGC). During its tenure (July 2003 - June 2004), the IGCwas less active than expected; some believe it was too heavily dominated by exilesand lacked legitimacy.In September 2003, the IGC selected a 25-member  cabinetto run individual ministries.The  cabinet had roughly the same factional and ethnicbalance of the IGC itself (a slight majority of Shiite Muslims).Among majoractions, the IGC began a process of  de-Baathification  a purge from governmentof about 30,000 persons who held any of the four top ranks of the Baath Party  andit authorized a war crimes tribunal for Saddam and his associates.The IGC dissolvedon June 1, 2004 when an interim government was named.Reflecting the heavy presence of exile leaders, the major figures on the IGCincluded leaders of several of the major factions mentioned above, including SCIRIleader Hakim; Da wa leader Jafari; Chalabi; Allawi; and Kurdish leaders Talabaniand Barzani.Some previously obscure figures were also on the IGC, including Ghazial-Yawar, a Sunni Muslim, senior member of the Shammar tribe and president ofSaudi-based Hicap Technology; and Iraqi Communist Party head Hamid al-Musa, aShiite Muslim.The party is making a comeback in Iraq [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]